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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3082 
_____________ 
  
IN RE: DIET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE/FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE) 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 
 
Patrick J. Venetz and Nancy E. Venetz, 
  Appellants  
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Nos. 2:99-cv-20593; MDL No. 2-16-md-1203; MDL No. 2-11-md-01203) 
District Judge: Hon. Harvey Bartle, III 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 10, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 10, 2015) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
Patrick J. Venetz (“Venetz”) and Nancy E. Venetz appeal from the District Court’s 
order denying Venetz’s claim for benefits under the Diet Drug Nationwide Class Action 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”).  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm.   
I 
Venetz’s appeal arises from the multi-district class action litigation regarding the 
diet drugs Pondimin® (fenfluramine) and Redux® (dexfenfluramine), previously sold by 
American Home Products (“AHP”)1.  See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 543 F.3d 
179, 181 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Patterson”).  AHP settled the litigation, placed funds in a trust 
for claim payments, and established the “Settlement Trust” (the “Trust”) to review and 
administer benefit claims by Pondimin® and Redux® users who suffer from “severe 
heart-valve regurgitation” or other “less severe heart-valve conditions that progress to the 
more serious levels” during the fifteen-year period following execution of the Settlement 
Agreement.  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 385 F.3d 386, 390–92 (3d Cir. 2004).2   
To obtain benefits under the Settlement Agreement, a claimant must complete and 
submit to the Trust a multi-part “Green Form.”  Patterson, 543 F.3d at 182.  In Part I of 
the Green Form, the claimant provides personal background information, including the 
level of benefits for which he believes he is qualified.  Part II of the Green Form is 
completed by a board-certified cardiologist or cardiothoracic surgeon (an “attesting 
                                              
 1 AHP changed its name to Wyeth in 2002.  See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 385 F.3d 386, 388 n.1 (3d Cir. 2004).  Pfizer, Inc. acquired Wyeth in 2009.   
2 We have detailed the diet drugs litigation (commonly known as the “Fen-Phen 
litigation”) and the settlement in several opinions.  See, e.g., Patterson, 543 F.3d at 180–
81; In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 206–08 (3d Cir. 2006); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 145–48 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 
F.3d 220, 225–29 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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physician”) who has reviewed the claimant’s echocardiogram and attests to the medical 
conditions underlying the claimant’s benefits request.   
Venetz submitted a “Green Form” for Trust benefits.  In it, Robert L. Rosenthal, 
M.D. attested that, based on his review of Venetz’s September 29, 2002 echocardiogram, 
Venetz had “[m]oderate mitral regurgitation.”  JA 3339.  Dr. Rosenthal also attested that 
Venetz underwent surgery “to repair or replace the aortic and/or mitral valve(s)” due to 
his use of Pondimin® or Redux®, JA 3313, and had “[v]entricular fibrillation or 
sustained ventricular tachycardia” resulting in “hemodynamic compromise,” JA 3315.  In 
combination, such conditions would entitle a claimant to benefits at severity “Level V” of 
the Settlement Agreement Matrix A-1.3   
 Waleed N. Irani, M.D., one of the Trust’s auditing cardiologists, evaluated 
Venetz’s claim and applied a “reasonable medical basis” standard to determine the 
validity of the moderate mitral regurgitation diagnosis.  See Patterson, 543 F.3d at 183–
84.  Dr. Irani found that Venetz had only mild mitral regurgitation4 and, contrary to Dr. 
Rosenthal, concluded that there “was no reasonable medical basis” to find moderate 
                                              
 3 A claimant’s benefits are determined by a pair of “matrices,” Matrix A and 
Matrix B, which classify claimants based on factors such as the severity of their medical 
condition, age, length of illness, and the presence of other medical conditions that may 
impact their valvular heart disease.  Patterson, 543 F.3d at 181.  In general, the longer the 
claimant took the drug(s) and the more severe the injury, the greater the monetary 
compensation.  The gross value of Venetz’s claim under Level V of Matrix A-1 is 
approximately $1,289,418.   
 4 The District Court has previously noted that measuring the severity of 
regurgitation is critical because “not all levels of mitral regurgitation are medically 
significant.”  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 445, 450 (E.D. Pa. 
2002) (“PTO 2640”) (stating that mild and trace mitral regurgitation exists in 
approximately ninety percent of the population but moderate levels of mitral 
regurgitation can “become[] a serious medical condition”). 
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mitral regurgitation entitling Venetz to Matrix A-1, Level V benefits.  JA 3399.  As a 
result, the Trust denied Venetz’s request for such benefits.   
 Venetz contested the Trust’s determination and provided declarations by Drs. 
Rosenthal and Paul W. Dlabal attesting that Venetz suffered from “at least” moderate 
mitral regurgitation.  JA 3407, 3413.  The Trust forwarded Venetz’s submission to Dr. 
Irani.  In response, Dr. Irani submitted a declaration again concluding that there was no 
reasonable medical basis for the Green Form’s attestation that Venetz’s echocardiogram 
showed moderate mitral regurgitation.5  Based on this declaration, the Trust denied 
Venetz’s benefits claim.   
                                              
5 Specifically, Dr. Irani’s declaration explained:  
Only mild mitral regurgitation is present in real time.  The Nyquist setting 
at those points identified by Drs. Rosenthal and Dlabal is very low, at 
41cm/sec, resulting in an increased color signal and falsely inflated jet size 
to a[] [regurgitant jet area/left atrial area] ratio of 20% . . . .  However, these 
still frames do not reflect the actual degree of mitral regurgitation and do 
not reasonably support a finding of moderate mitral regurgitation.  These 
sill [sic] frames reflect inflated jet size due to very low Nyquist setting 
resulting in increased color signal.  The still frames identified by Drs. 
Rosenthal and Dlabal are not representative of mitral regurgitation seen in 
real time.  Mitral regurgitation is mild in real time. 
 
JA 3460 (emphasis in original).  The “Nyquist” limit setting is “particularly important to 
the image displayed on the echocardiogram machine.”  PTO 2640, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 
452.  It represents “the highest velocity of blood flow that an echocardiogram machine 
can accurately measure.”  Id.  “For example, if the Nyquist limit is set [to] 70 cm/second, 
the machine can only accurately calculate and display the velocity of blood that is 
moving slower than 70 cm/second.”  Id.  As the District Court has explained: 
 
Although medical literature does not propose an optimal Nyquist limit for 
echocardiograms, the generally accepted practice is the higher the better.  
Accordingly, a Nyquist limit in the 30’s or 40’s may not be as ideal for 
 5 
 
 Venetz disputed this determination and requested that his claim proceed through 
the “Show Cause process” set forth in the Settlement Agreement and the Audit Rules.  
Accordingly, the Trust applied for and the District Court issued an order (PTO 8986) 
requiring Venetz to show cause why his claim for benefits should be paid at the level 
stated in his Green Form.  The District Court referred the claim to the Special Master for 
further proceedings.  
 In accordance with the Audit Rules, the Special Master appointed a “Technical 
Advisor,” Gary J. Vigilante, M.D., to review Venetz’s claim and the parties’ submissions.  
Vigilante issued a “Technical Advisor Report” finding no reasonable medical basis for 
Dr. Rosenthal’s Green Form attestation that Venetz had moderate mitral regurgitation 
because “the echocardiogram of September 29, 2002 was of poor quality and an accurate 
[regurgitant jet area] could not be determined.”  JA 3604.  Although the Report noted 
evidence of mitral regurgitation, it “most likely was mild,” with the echocardiogram’s 
poor quality rendering it “impossible to quantify [its] severity.”  JA 3599.  
  The District Court affirmed the Trust’s denial of Venetz’s claim, crediting the 
opinions of Drs. Irani and Vigilante that Venetz “failed to establish a reasonable medical 
basis for finding that he was not diagnosed ‘as having Mild Mitral Regurgitation.’”  JA 
19 (citing Settlement Agreement § IV.B.2.d.(2)(a), 893–94.).  Venetz appeals.          
                                                                                                                                                  
identifying and measuring a mitral regurgitant jet as would a limit in the 
60’s or 70’s. 
 
Id. 
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 Venetz raises two issues on appeal.  First, he asserts that “there is no rule of law” 
for determining, nor does the Settlement Agreement define, what constitutes a 
“reasonable medical basis” under the Settlement Agreement.  Appellant Br. 16–17.  As a 
result, he argues that deference should be given to his physician, and that the claimant 
should be required to show only that his physician’s opinions are not “absurd, ridiculous, 
extreme, or irrational.”  Reply Br. 26.  He further asserts that “the Trust [should be 
required to] put forth evidence to show that the attesting physician and any physician in 
support of the claim failed to act as ordinary and prudent physicians.”  Appellant Br. 24.  
Second, he argues that the District Court misapplied that standard in affirming the Trust’s 
denial of his benefits claim.   
 We disagree with both arguments.  Although the Settlement Agreement does not 
define the term “reasonable medical basis,” JA 964–66, the standard is articulated in, 
among other things: (i) the practices identified by the District Court in In re Diet Drugs 
                                              
 6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review a District Court’s exercise of its 
equitable authority to administer and implement a class action settlement for abuse of 
discretion.”  Patterson, 543 F.3d at 184 n.10.  This abuse of discretion standard applies 
because implementation of a settlement usually involves contract interpretation, which 
concerns the process by which a court “seeks to ascertain the intent of the parties [that is] 
embodied in the language that the parties chose to memorialize their agreement.”  
Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 946 (3d Cir. 1997).  An abuse of discretion may be 
found if the District Court’s decision “rest[s] on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  Patterson, 543 F.3d 
at 184 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 
233 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that unlike contract construction, “contract 
interpretation is a question of fact” subject to review under “the clearly erroneous 
standard”). 
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Prods. Liab. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 445 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“PTO 2640”); (ii) other orders 
of the District Court, Patterson, 543 F.3d at 186; and (iii) the “Auditing Cardiologist 
Training Course,” see id. at 185–86 & 187 n.16 (rejecting argument that “the District 
Court has not concretely defined ‘reasonable medical basis’”).  As such, the standard 
exists and “[Venetz] and h[is] attorneys had sufficient notice” of it.  Id. at 187 n.16.   
 In PTO 2640, the District Court explained that a diagnosis lacks a “reasonable 
medical basis” if it is “beyond the bounds of medical reason,” PTO 2640, 236 F. Supp. 2d 
at 458, and provided the following examples: 
(1) failing to review multiple loops and still frames; (2) failing to have a 
Board Certified Cardiologist properly supervise and interpret the 
echocardiogram; (3) failing to examine the regurgitant jet throughout a 
portion of systole; (4) over-manipulating echocardiogram settings; (5) 
setting a low Nyquist limit; (6) characterizing “artifacts,” “phantom jets,” 
“backflow” and other low velocity flow as mitral regurgitation; (7) failing 
to take a claimant’s medical history; and (8) overtracing the amount of a 
claimant’s regurgitation. 
 
JA 16 (citing PTO 2640).  Thus, a diagnosis predicated upon any of these facts would 
lack a reasonable medical basis.   
 The Audit Rules also address who bears the burden of showing the existence of a 
reasonable medical basis.  For instance, under Audit Rule 24, the auditing cardiologist’s 
findings are essentially viewed as correct, unless the claimant can show his attesting 
physician’s opinion has a reasonable medical basis.  Thus, “[o]nce the Trust denies a 
claim and the claim advances to a show cause proceeding, the claimant has the burden of 
proving there was a reasonable medical basis for the attesting physician’s 
representations.”  Patterson, 543 F.3d at 189.  To carry this burden, the claimant must 
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present evidence rebutting the auditing cardiologist and/or the Technical Advisor’s 
conclusion that the attesting physician lacked a reasonable medical basis for his opinion.  
See id. at 190.  Therefore, Venetz’s assertion that his doctor’s views should be deemed 
presumptively correct and rejected only if they are absurd, ridiculous, extreme, or 
excessive, is inconsistent with the factors used to determine whether a reasonable medical 
basis exists and the Audit Rules governing the Settlement Trust, which require him to 
show why the auditing cardiologist and Technical Advisor are wrong and that his 
physicians had a reasonable medical basis for their opinion.  We will not disturb the 
agreed-upon and court-approved burdens of proof nor read new definitions into the 
Settlement Agreement and thus we reject his first argument.   
 We also reject his second argument, as the District Court did not clearly err in 
affirming the Trust’s denial of Venetz’s benefits claim.  See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The test is not what this court 
would have done under the same circumstances; that is not enough.  [We] must feel that 
only one order could have been entered on the facts.” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  Here, the District Court evaluated the medical opinions presented to it 
and determined that Venetz failed to rebut the findings of the auditing cardiologist, Dr. 
Irani, and the Technical Advisor, Dr. Vigilante.  For example, the District Court credited 
the Technical Advisor’s finding that Venetz’s “level of regurgitation was inflated ‘due to 
inclusion of low velocity nonturbulent flow’ and an “‘inappropriately’ low” Nyquist 
limit, and as a result, his echocardiogram “‘was performed significantly below the 
appropriate standard of care.’”  JA 16–17 (quoting Technical Advisor Report at 7–8, JA 
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3599–3600).  Notably, Dr. Dlabal, one of Venetz’s attesting physicians, even conceded 
that “‘[t]he Nyquist Limit on this study is set at a somewhat low level.’”  JA 16 n.16 
(quoting Declaration of Dr. Dlabal at 2, JA 3413).  This deficiency shows that that there 
is a basis for concluding that Venetz’s doctors’ opinions lacked a reasonable medical 
basis.  As a result, Venetz has failed to demonstrate that the only conclusion that may be 
drawn from the record is that his echocardiogram showed moderate mitral regurgitation.  
Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Venetz failed to meet 
his burden of proving that there was a reasonable medical basis for his attesting 
physician’s finding of moderate mitral regurgitation.7  
III 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s Order affirming the Trust’s 
denial of Venetz’s claim for benefits. 
                                              
 7 Venetz’s assertion that “a report based on more than a single frame will rebut the 
auditing cardiologist’s assessment of the entire echocardiogram, provided that the report 
includes some indication of the maximum jet’s representativeness,” Appellant Br. 31 
(emphasis added) (citing Patterson, 543 F.3d at 185), is without basis.  The case upon 
which he relies, Patterson, held that an unrepresentative, single frame will never meet a 
claimant’s burden, as “the Settlement Agreement requires a cardiologist to review the 
echocardiogram for a regurgitant jet that is representative of the severity of the claimant’s 
medical condition,” 543 F.3d at 185.  Thus, the District Court also did not err in crediting 
Dr. Ilani’s conclusion that the “still frames” identified by Drs. Rosenthal and Dlabal “do 
not reflect the actual degree of mitral regurgitation and do not reasonably support a 
finding of moderate mitral regurgitation.”  JA 16. 
